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Abstract:  
The financial sector has a hidden, but dramatic effect on Hollywood: three institutional investors 
hold the largest investment stakes in nearly all major companies; corporate venture capital has 
arisen within every entertainment conglomerate; and private equity firms have enacted leveraged 
buyouts of companies in all sectors, including production, distribution, exhibition, talent 
agencies, audience measurement, trade press, and content catalogues. This article argues that 
“Financialized Hollywood” is a dangerous development; financial engineering strategies are 
extracting capital and reducing operational capacity, further depriving Hollywood of the 
diversity and heterogeneity it might provide the public sphere.   
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After a breakdown in negotiations with the Association of Talent Agencies on April 12, 
2019, the Writers Guild of America (WGA) took the unprecedented step of instructing its 
members to fire their agents. More than seven thousand writers—92 percent of the guild—
dutifully fired their agent. At issue was the WGA’s new Code of Conduct that prohibited agents 
from taking packaging fees (which they claim is a breach of fiduciary duty, as it incentivizes 
agencies to negotiate a lower fee for talent) or engaging in production (which they claim is a 
conflict of interest, as the agencies are again incentivized to lower fees). At the time of writing, 
seventy smaller agencies have signed on to the Code of Conduct. However, the big agencies—
Creative Artists Agency (CAA), Endeavor (formerly William Morris Endeavor Entertainment), 
United Talent Agency (UTA), and International Creative Management (ICM)—have filed 
lawsuits against the WGA, signaling a drawn-out, costly legal battle that the WGA might not be 
able to wage against firms now backed by massive investment firms like Texas Pacific Group 
(TPG) and Silver Lake. Regardless of the outcome, the bold labor action of the WGA 
demonstrates that creative workers in Hollywood may be coming to terms with the impact of 
‘financialization,’ defined here as the accelerated growth of the financial sector and its extractive 
logic, which relies on financial engineering rather than commodity production. The WGA report, 
“Agencies For Sale: Private Equity Investment and Soaring Agency Valuations,” is a 
surprisingly scathing indictment of CAA and Endeavor, but the deep, destructive influence of the 
financial sector in Hollywood goes much deeper than just the talent agencies.1 
 Since the 1970s, the global economy has been reshaped by the rise of the financial 
industries; however, there has not been a corresponding transformation in the scholarly study of 
the financialization of the cutural industries. Various scholars assess the structural trends that 
have transformed the U.S. media industry by emphasizing the growth of corporations, 
  
integration, globalization, the concentration of ownership, digitization, networking, and 
deregulation.2 This article’s primary motive is to impress upon its readers the scale of the impact 
that the financial sector has had on the American film and television industries in the last twenty 
years and thus demonstrate that financialization belongs on that list of key structural trends. Janet 
Wasko did pioneering, underutilized work in this area over thirty-five years ago, but the topic 
has since been largely ignored, despite the need, as Micky Lee articulates, for the study of 
“financial institutions’ direct intervention in media companies’ management and restructuring.”3 
“The new rulers of Hollywood—and of the global entertainment industry at large,” film historian 
Thomas Schatz claims, detailing ‘Conglomerate Hollywood,’ are “not the studios but their parent 
companies, the media giants like Viacom (owner of Paramount Pictures), Sony (Columbia), 
Time Warner (Warner Bros.), and News Corp. (20th Century Fox).”4 Jennifer Holt’s Empires of 
Entertainment complements this historical narrative with the legal, regulatory, and political 
dimensions of how film and then broadcast and cable television became integrated in the 1980s 
and 1990s.5 The following article picks up where these histories end and proposes that in 
“Financialized Hollywood,” the media giants themselves are now beholden to the larger process 
of financialization.6  The big conglomerates still dominate film and television production and 
distribution, but they are mere investment and profit-extraction opportunities for truly powerful 
firms such as Blackrock, Vanguard, Bain Capital, TPG, and Silver Lake, whose watchwords are 
highly-leveraged debt, labor efficiencies, and speculation.  
A heightened awareness of the financial processes and ideologies that undergird the 
actions of media companies, executives, and practitioners is needed. Understanding 
Financialized Hollywood requires an analytic perspective attuned to the logic of financial capital, 
not just the multinational entertainment corporation. This article demonstrates the ascendancy of 
  
financial capital within Hollywood in six steps. First, it examines the broader concept of 
financialization and the role of passive institutional investment firms, which hold the largest 
stakes in nearly all Hollywood companies. Second, it documents the rise and influence of 
corporate venture capital within every entertainment conglomerate. Third, it analyzes the 
destructive effect of private equity, which has enacted leveraged buyouts of companies in all 
sectors of Hollywood, including production, distribution, exhibition, audience measurement, and 
trade press. Fourth and fifth, it focuses on talent agencies and content catalogues as particularly 
insidious cases of private equity extraction; and finally, it considers the role that this financial 
engineering is having in the further consolidation of Hollywood. Ultimately, this article argues 
that the financialization of the film and television industry is a dangerous development; financial 
engineering strategies are extracting capital and reducing operational capacity, further depriving 
Hollywood of the diversity and heterogeneity it might provide the public sphere.  
 
Neoliberalism, Financialization, and Institutional Investment. “The only general point of 
agreement,” David Harvey proclaims, in evaluating the discourse surrounding the advancement 
of capitalism, “is that something significant has changed in the way capitalism has been working 
since about 1970.”10 For Harvey, a key part of that change is the empowerment of finance capital 
in relation to the diminished nation state, resulting from loose monetary policy by the American 
and British governments, unmoored exchange rates, and the general breakdown of Fordism and 
Keynesianism in the early 1970s. This accelerated form of capitalism has come to be formalized 
under the term neoliberalism for Harvey and many others.11 “Neoliberalism is a new stage of 
capitalism,” according to Gérard Duménil and Dominique Lévy, “that emerged in the wake of 
the structural crisis of the 1970s. It expresses the strategy of the capitalist classes in alliance with 
  
upper management, specifically financial managers, intending to strengthen their hegemony and 
to expand it globally.”12 What separates neoliberalism from previous forms of capitalism is the 
concentration of power within financial institutions and the use of exotic financial instruments, 
such as derivatives and securitization, to exert control over the means of production.  
Deregulation is an essential component of this shift. It is promoted wherever and 
whenever possible, especially for financial mechanisms, resulting in the protection of lenders, 
the opening of trade frontiers, the privatization of social protection and pensions, the curbing of 
inflationary pressures through monetary policies, and the dramatic rise of government and 
household debt. Media industry historians consider the deregulation of media ownership 
restrictions and the easing of antitrust concerns in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, to be transformational events, but far less remarked upon is 
the corresponding deregulation of financial mechanisms that occurred during the same era. The 
U.S. removed capital controls in 1974, eased banking restrictions with the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 
1982, and repealed the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, which allowed bank holding companies to 
own investment banks. These deregulations are an essential component to what Duménil and 
Lévy claim is the “return to financial hegemony” during the rise of neoliberalism, in which the 
upper fraction of the capitalist class has a nearly unbridled ability to shape the economy and 
society with impunity, as it did in the 1900s and 1910s.13  
However, as a conceptual term, neoliberalism is somewhat vague; it can refer to political 
projects, ideologies, economic shifts, and other reconfigurations that have developed since 1970. 
According to Christian Garland and Stephen Harper, following Fredric Jameson, use of the term 
neoliberalism, rather than capitalism or class struggle, risks depicting recent shifts as mere 
  
aberrations in need of reform, which “precludes the structural critique of capitalism and its media 
institutions.”14 Financialization, on the other hand, is a less understood and more delimited 
concept; it refers solely to the expansion and increased power of the financial sector. Built 
gradually, starting from banks and insurance companies in the nineteenth century, financial 
institutions have come to form a networked framework of imposing scale: stock exchanges, 
mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, private equity firms, derivative markets, central 
banks, government-sponsored enterprises, and international institutions (such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank).  
A multitude of financial instruments have been developed to facilitate transactions across 
this network, one of the most significant being dividends, which are portions of a company’s 
profits that are periodically paid out to shareholders. During the postwar period, a considerable 
share of profits was retained by corporations for productive reinvestment; in the intervening 
years, dividends have soared, as have stock buybacks, when a company buys back its shares 
from the marketplace, inflating the value of the remaining stock. The result is that profits are 
mostly distributed among the investor class, while corporations curtail opportunities for 
reinvestment, including employee wages. Corporations are thus seen less as producers of goods 
and services and more as vehicles for speculative capital. 
The rise of institutional investors is a striking case of this corporate speculation. 
Institutional investors—entities that pool capital, such as banks, insurance companies, pensions, 
hedge funds, endowments, and mutual funds—have gone from owning about 7 percent of the 
U.S. stock market in 1950, to 70-80 percent today, a remarkable demonstration of the era’s 
financialization.15 If counted collectively, the largest institutional investment firms—the “Big 
Three” of BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street—are the largest owner of 88 percent of the 
  
companies listed on the Standard & Poor's 500 (an index of the 500 largest U.S. publicly traded 
companies determined by market capitalization), up from 25 percent in 2000.16 Worse still, 
institutional investors simultaneously hold large blocks of competing firms within the same 
industry, known as “common ownership” or “horizontal shareholding,” the rate of which has 
increased from less than 10 percent in 1980 to about 60 percent in 2010.17 As a result, these 
companies are incentivized to keep prices high and wages low. Far from ‘passive’ investment 
vehicles, as they were designed, earning light regulation, institutional investors now actively 
engage in their investments by exercising the voting power of the shares owned by their funds. 
The Big Three utilize coordinated voting strategies and meet privately with management and 
board members in order to influence the direction of their investments.18 Common ownership of 
airlines was discovered to have increased prices by as much as 5 percent, while common 
ownership of banks led to increases in fees and reductions in interest rates.19 This common 
ownership pattern is visible across many industries; the largest owners of Apple and Microsoft, 
for example, are Vanguard and BlackRock, just as they are for drugstores CVS, Walgreens, and 
Rite Aid. 
This pattern of common ownership by institutional investors is readily apparent in the 
media sector as well, as demonstrated in Table 1, where we can see a cross-section of just how 
much institutional investors dominate the cultural industries. The Big Three are right where you 
should expect them: they own the largest stakes in all rival companies, gravely harming 
competition. Vanguard, the largest provider of mutual funds and the inventor of the index fund, 
holding more than $5 trillion in assets under management, owns the largest stake in Disney, 
Comcast, Time Warner, Verizon, and AT&T, and the second largest stake in CBS and Netflix.20 
By this metric, nearly every popular film or television program should include a “brought to you  
  
Table 1. Largest institutional shareholders in the largest publicly-traded media companies, 
March, 2018. Source: Company 13F Filings. 
 
Company Fund % Ownership Combined % of Big Three 
Disney (DIS) Vanguard 6.82% 
17.01% 
 Blackrock 5.99% 
 State Street 4.20% 
 State Farm 2.80% 
Comcast (CMCSA) Vanguard 7.02% 
17.80% 
 Blackrock 6.96% 
 Capital World Investors 4.01% 
 State Street 3.82% 
Time Warner (TWX) Vanguard 6.62% 
16.36% 
 Blackrock 5.90% 
 Dodge & Cox 4.05% 
 State Street 3.83% 
CBS (CBS) Capital World Investors 11.20% 
15.16% 
 Vanguard 6.17% 
 Blackrock 5.43% 
 State Street 3.56% 
Netflix (NFLX) Capital Research Global Investors 9.54% 
12.98% 
 Vanguard 6.80% 
 Blackrock 6.18% 
 Fidelity 5.76% 
Verizon (VZ) Vanguard 7.29% 
17.83% 
 Blackrock 6.62% 
 State Street 3.92% 
 Capital Research Global Investors 3.49% 
AT&T (T) Vanguard 7.25% 
17.53% 
 Blackrock 6.31% 
 State Street 3.97% 
 Newport Trust Company 3.27% 
 
  
  
by Vanguard” title card during its credit sequence. Blackrock and State Street aren’t far behind, 
for the Big Three forms an interlocking group of ownership here as it does in many industries. 
This is most visible in the cases of Disney, Comcast, Time Warner, CBS, Verizon, and AT&T, 
as the Big Three own a combined 15-18 percent stake in each of them. Capital World and Capital 
Research Global Investors are each a subsidiary of the Los Angeles-based Capital Research and 
Management Company, which appears to have an outsized interest in its city’s most famous 
industry.  
Knowing that common ownership in other industries results in decreased competition and 
increased prices, we should expect the same in Hollywood, even though specific outcomes and 
effects on content are difficult to isolate. The propensity for joint ventures (e.g., Hulu, The CW, 
Epix, Movies Anywhere) and joint franchises (e.g., Harry Potter, Terminator, LEGO, James 
Bond, Lord of the Rings, The Hobbit, Spiderman) is the kind of outcome we can expect from 
common ownership. Another is that movie ticket prices continue to rise beyond inflation because 
of the increasingly onerous terms set by the major studios. For example, in order to screen Star 
Wars: The Rise Of Skywalker (J.J. Abrams, 2019), Disney required four-week engagements in 
the largest auditorium for a film rental of 65%.21 Disney’s market power may be the most 
immediate factor in that deal, but institutional investment also plays a long-term role. Much like 
climate change, in which any one extreme weather event is difficult to conclusively attribute to 
human-caused climate change, but the overall probability of extreme weather steadily rises, in 
Financialized Hollywood, the overall tendency toward consolidation, reduced operational 
capacity, and minimal competition increases within a climate of financialization and common 
ownership.  
  
  
Corporate Venture Capital in Hollywood. The impact of institutional investment can be 
considered an external force of financialization acting on the cultural industries; corporate 
venture capital (CVC) is a corresponding internal force. CVC refers to minority equity 
investment in an entrepreneurial venture by an established corporation. The parent corporation 
(e.g., Comcast) operates a financial intermediary or corporate venture capital program (e.g. 
Comcast Ventures) which makes equity or equity-linked investments in early-stage, privately 
held companies (e.g., Vox Media). Originally created to allow customers to finance the purchase 
of consumer products manufactured by the industrial division, the financial arms of major 
corporations are now often growing faster than their manufacturing divisions. Their financial 
activities, products, and global scale have come to resemble investment banks and hedge funds 
more than those of their parent companies. Three short-lived waves of CVC occurred during the 
1960s, 1980s, and 1990s, but the current wave appears to be both  more pronounced and longer 
lasting, with corporate investors accounting for roughly 15 percent of all venture capital activity 
since 2000.22 For large media companies, investment in tech start-ups through CVC has many 
functions: earning profits that do not need to be shared with talent, preventing new competition 
from gaining a foothold, and maintaining an oligopoly. 
 Independent venture capital funds are entirely driven by financial objectives, but 
corporate venture capital pursues strategic goals in addition to financial gains.23 As massive 
corporations grow, they become less agile and able to respond to market changes; CVC allows 
them to engage in research and development (R&D) by proxy, acquiring resources and 
intellectual property from their ventures. Incorporating CVC into their innovation strategy allows 
big companies to gather information on new markets and technologies, monitor their growth, and 
enter them more easily. Identifying and assessing potential acquisition targets is another key 
  
function of CVC; the investment can even be made with an option to acquire the portfolio 
company if certain metrics are reached. CVC is also used by corporations to hedge their bets, 
ensuring that they are strategically placed in regards to emerging technologies, ready to act when 
the dominant design prevails.  
As catalogued in Table 2, the media sector has been utilizing corporate venture capital 
heavily since 2000, in either a direct or indirect fashion. Traditional media parent companies 
have been making direct, focused venture capital investments in proven corporate entities, such 
as Disney’s $400 million stake in Vice Media and NBCUniversal’s $200 million stake in 
Buzzfeed. Meanwhile, these legacy media companies have also created semi-independent 
venture capital arms that make riskier bets with early-stage seed funding for companies in a 
variety of related sectors, such as virtual reality, streaming technologies, and digital publishing 
companies that reach underserved niche audiences. For example, traditional media companies 
have invested heavily in start-ups that appeal specifically to millennial and Gen-Z audiences, 
such as Bustle, Mic, Fusion, and HelloGiggles. The overall number of investment stakes by 
traditional media companies is vast, totaling over a thousand.  
A lot of punditry suggests that Vice, Buzzfeed, and other new content companies are 
upending the traditional media hierarchy, but these new media companies are mere investment 
vehicles and R&D arms for traditional media. As investors, traditional media companies are 
entitled access to the latest digital developments and detailed reports about the preferences of 
young audiences. If any of these start-ups achieve success and prominent recognition, they 
become acquisition targets, such as Viacom’s purchase of Pluto TV, or lucrative paydays in the 
event of an initial public offering (IPO), such as Spotify. From radio to television to cable to 
VCRs and into the digital age, the Hollywood oligopoly has historically been able to coopt any  
  
Table 2. Corporate venture capital arms of major media companies. Source: Crunchbase. 
Venture Capital Arm Year Est. Investments Select Investments 
Comcast 2000 10 SnagFilms, Invite Media, MetaTV 
     Comcast Ventures 2007 207 Vox, Slack, FanDuel, Meerkat, Instacart 
     NBCUniversal 2007 20 Vice, Buzzfeed, Popsugar 
Walt Disney 2000 12 Hulu, Jaunt, Vice, BAMTech 
     Steamboat Ventures  2000 107 GoPro, Photobucket, GameSalad, NetMovie 
      Disney Accelerator 2014 23 Littlstar, Twigtale, Naritiv 
      Shamrock Capital Advisors  2007 11 FanDuel, T3Media, Maple Media 
News Corp 2000 20 Roku, Beyond Oblivion, AppNexus 
      21st Century Fox 2013 7 Vice, DraftKings, The Skimm 
TimeWarner 2000 21 Hulu, Glu Mobile, Urban Entertainment 
      Time Warner Investments 2000 78 Mashable, Bustle, StubHub, Maker Studios 
Sony Venture Capital 1998 21 Digilens, Transmeta, CDNow 
Sony Music Entertainment 2000 7 Shazam, 360HipHop, Artistdirect 
Universal Music Group 2000 30 Shazam, Meerkat, Merchbar, Pluto TV 
Warner Music Group 2000 10 LANDR, Incoming Media, imeem, Lala 
iHeartMedia 2015 2 Unified, Jelli 
Bertelsmann 1999 26 Udacity, DramaFever, Musicbank 
      Bertelsmann Dig. Media Investments 2006 25 Mic, CrowdTwist, Visionary VR 
Liberty Media 1999 19 SiriusXM, Tastemade, Sling Media 
      Liberty Global Ventures 2005 26 Mediamorph, Celeno, O3b Networks 
CAA Ventures 2012 49 Rinse, Giphy, Patreon, CrowdRise, Medium 
Discovery Communications 2010 9 DivvyCloud, FloSports, VS Media 
Hearst 2000 21 Complex, Roku, Pandora, Refinery29 
       Hearst Ventures 1995 71 Buzzfeed, Pandora, XM Radio, Refinery29 
Axel Springer 2013 13 Mic, Thrillist, Jaunt 
       Axel Springer Digital Ventures 2014 8 Business Insider, Blendle, Pocket 
AOL Ventures 2010 43 MoviePass, SocialFlow, TastemakerX 
Sky TV and Broadband 2012 23 iflix, Jaunt, Drone League Racing 
Verizon Ventures 2000 68 VideoSurf, Beamr, School Yourself 
The New York Times 1999 27 The Skimm, Atlas Obscura, The Street 
  
  
new technological development and turn it into another revenue source; corporate venture capital 
is merely the latest, financialized chapter in this age-old story. However, an even larger 
dimension of financialization is also transforming the industry. To paraphrase the title of a 
popular book about the rise of “corporate raiders,” there are “Barbarians at the Gate” of 
Hollywood.24 
 
Private Equity in Hollywood. Another manner in which corporations are treated as speculative 
capital is through the actions of private equity firms. Previously known as leveraged buyout 
firms or “corporate raiders” during their rise in the 1980s, private equity (PE) firms, such as Bain 
Capital, Blackstone Group, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR), Texas Pacific Group (TPG), 
Thomas H. Lee Partners (THL), the Carlyle Group, and Apollo Management, are a specialized, 
high-risk type of investment fund that are subject to minimal regulatory oversight. Typically 
operating investment funds with five to ten year terms, PE firms raise enormous levels of debt 
against the assets of the target company (referred to as “leverage”), purchase the company, 
restructure and financially engineer the company to maximize efficiency, then sell the 
streamlined company or its assets at high profit margins. Since the turn of the century, in part 
due to expansionary monetary policy and favorable tax breaks, there has been a huge boom in PE 
deals, only temporarily slowed by the financial collapse. From 2002-2012, there were nearly 
3,000 private equity firms in the U.S., which used $3.4 trillion of capital to make leveraged 
buyouts of almost 18,000 companies, employing roughly 7.5 million people.25 
The modus operandi of private equity firms is succinctly summarized by Eileen 
Appelbaum and Rosemary Batt as “tak[ing] high risks using other people’s money.”26 Though 
they only invest 1 to 2 percent of the equity in the private equity fund, the PE firms receive 20 
  
percent of the profit if the rate of return achieves a certain threshold (usually 8 percent). To fund 
the rest of the acquisition, PE firms solicit investment from pension funds, endowments, 
sovereign wealth funds, and investment banks, while also raising debt in junk bond markets. 
With these massive funds (upwards of $20 billion), private equity firms extract value from their 
target companies through financial engineering: paying themselves dividends, exploiting tax and 
debt loopholes, selling assets for profit, going into and out of bankruptcy, and not honoring 
contracts, as well as various methods of lowering labor costs, such as laying off high-wage labor, 
reducing wages and benefits, intensifying workloads, and shifting to non-unionized workers. 
With little to lose if the company’s debt drives it to eliminate labor or even file for bankruptcy, 
but much to gain if the investment can be exited from successfully, private equity is a textbook 
case of “moral hazard,” as someone else bears the cost of their risks. Recent scholarly work in 
media production studies often focuses on the precarious conditions faced by workers in the 
cultural industries, often utilizing a “bottom-up” perspective, but it’s worth complementing these 
considerations with the “top-down” perspective that labor conditions are often facilitated by 
abstract financial processes as well.27 
Hollywood has faced instances of extractive financial engineering in the past, such as 
Kirk Kerkorian’s pillaging of MGM in the 1970s and the corporate raiders that reconfigured 
Disney in the 1980s. However, there has been a pronounced escalation of these practices in the 
media sector in the past fifteen years. Elsewhere, I have marked the beginning of the 
financialization of the music industries with the purchase of Warner Music Group in 2004 by 
Bain Capital, THL Partners, Providence Equity Partners, and Edgar Bronfman.28 That same year,  
MGM was the target of a leveraged buyout with one of the same private equity firms. As 
evidenced in Table 3, MGM was the first major buyout in the era of financialization, followed by  
  
Table 3. Private equity buyouts and investment in Hollywood, 2004-2018. Source: Wall Street 
Journal and Bloomberg Businessweek. 
 
Year Target Buyer/Partner/Investor Cost/$ bn Type Medium 
2004 MGM Providence Equity Partners, TPG Capital, Sony, 
Quadrangle Group, DLJ Merchant Banking Partners 
4.8 Leveraged 
Buyout 
Film/TV 
2004 Cinemark Madison Dearborn Partners 1 Leveraged 
Buyout 
Exhibition 
2004 AMC 
theaters 
J.P. Morgan Partners, Apollo Global Management 2 Leveraged 
Buyout 
Exhibition 
2004 Odeon & 
UCI Cinema 
Terra Firma 1.2 Leveraged 
Buyout 
Exhibition 
2006 Nielsen 
Company 
THL Partners, Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group, 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Hellman & Friedman, 
AlpInvest Partners 
9.7 Leveraged 
Buyout 
Data 
2007 Univision TPG Capital, Providence Equity Partners, THL 
Partners, Madison Dearborn Partners, and Haim Saban 
13.7 Leveraged 
Buyout 
Film/TV 
2007 Hulu Providence Equity Partners 0.1 Investment Film/TV 
2008 Dreamworks Reliance ADA Group 0.325 Investment Film/TV 
2008 The Weather 
Channel 
Blackstone, Bain Capital, NBCU 3.5 Leveraged 
Buyout 
Film/TV 
2010 Miramax Colony Capital 0.66 Leveraged 
Buyout 
Film/TV 
2010 AMC 
theaters 
J.P. Morgan Partners, Apollo Global Management --- IPO Exhibition 
2010 CAA TPG Capital 0.165 Min. Stake Talent 
2011 Nielsen 
Company 
THL Partners, Blackstone Group, Carlyle Group, 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Hellman & Friedman, 
AlpInvest Partners 
--- IPO Data 
2012 WME Silver Lake ~0.250 Min. Stake Talent 
2012 Providence's 
share in Hulu 
News Corp, Disney, NBCU 0.2 Exit Film/TV 
2013 WME Silver Lake 0.5 Maj. Stake Talent 
2013 IMG WME/Silver Lake 2.2 Acquisition Talent 
2014 CAA TPG Capital 0.225 Maj. Stake Talent 
2016 UFC WME/Silver Lake, KKR 4 Acquisition Film/TV 
2018 Wanda/AMC Silver Lake 0.6 Investment Exhibition 
  
  
many others. Far from its halcyon days of Gone with the Wind (Victor Fleming, 1939) and The 
Wizard of Oz (Victor Fleming, 1939), MGM struggled for many years, losing $1.6 billion over 
just six years in the 1990s.29 Seizing the opportunity to acquire a distressed asset, a consortium of 
investors purchased MGM for $4.85 billion in 2004, each getting a sizable stake: Providence 
Equity Partners (34 percent), TPG Capital (23 percent), Comcast (21 percent), Sony (14 percent), 
and DLJ Merchant Partners (8 percent). As with most PE deals, this one was highly leveraged, 
and MGM was saddled with $3.7 billion of debt.  
On paper, MGM’s assets looked promising: a 4,000+ film library, 43,000+ hours of 
television, and lucrative franchises like James Bond, Rocky, and Spider-Man. Sony hoped to 
exploit this content catalogue with cross-content synergies, while Comcast intended to populate 
its cable and on-demand channels. However, the DVD market had just begun to decline in 2004; 
the digital sales, rentals, and subscription market had yet to take off; and MGM was releasing 
few films of its own. Furthermore, the standard private equity playbook of mass layoffs 
backfired: “so many people were let go,” according to Variety, “that MGM was no longer a 
viable operating company.”30 By 2010, the company was drowning in interest payments on its 
debt to the tune of $300 million a year and filed for bankruptcy in order to clear its debt. With a 
loan from JPMorgan Chase and two hedge funds, Anchorage Advisors and Highland Capital 
Management, it would reemerge the following week, but the original PE firms would lose out on 
their investment (as would any pension funds or endowments involved). The subsequent layoffs 
were, of course, severe.31 
In 2007, during the height of the pre-crash private equity boom, an even larger leveraged 
buyout occurred with the $13.7 billion takeover of Univision, the Spanish-language broadcasting 
giant. As the owner of the largest media properties in the fastest-growing demographic segment 
  
of the U.S. media industry, Univision was a prime target. It attracted two consortiums, the first 
including PE giants KKR, Carlyle, and Blackstone, and the second, successful consortium 
consisting of Providence Equity Partners, TPG, THL, Madison Dearborn Partners, and Saban 
Capital Group.32 The latter group leveraged their deal with a debt level twelve times Univision’s 
annual cash flow, twice the norm of buyouts during that time.33 Within two years, Univision was 
weighed down by nearly $11 billion in debt, forcing it to sell its music arm to Universal Music 
Group (strengthening Universal’s monopolistic position in the music market) and to conduct 
multiple rounds of layoffs, including “periodic staff purges and management restructuring.”34 By 
2017, Univision’s capacity to produce compelling content was severely hampered, and it ceded 
almost half of its audience to rival Telemundo. Amidst declining advertising revenues, its PE 
firms are seeking to exit their investment by filing for an IPO in order to pay off its now-
maturing $9 billion debt. 
Another prominent media company acquired during the private equity boom, in 2006, 
was Nielsen, then the Dutch publishing company VNU NV, owner of Nielsen Media Research 
and venerable industry trade press publications Adweek, The Hollywood Reporter, and Billboard. 
Again, we can witness the private equity formula: a consortium of PE companies (in this case, 
KKR, THL, Blackstone, Carlyle, Hellman & Friedman, and AlpInvest Partners) acquires the 
company for an enormous price ($9.7 billion), saddles it with excessive debt (still $8.6 billion 
five years later), strips its assets (the iconic publications) for capital extraction, slashes its 
workforce (in a 4,000 person “restructuring”), and exits the investment with a profit achieved 
through financial engineering. In 2011, their return was estimated at 10 percent, far higher than 
typical investments over that time period.35  
  
The fallout of this deal for Hollywood’s trade press is another example of private equity 
impropriety. In 2009, the PE-managed Nielsen sold its suite of trade publications to another 
investment firm, Guggenheim Partners, which acquired the properties in partnership with 
Pluribus Capital, naming the new company e5 Global Media. The entity experienced more 
turmoil and cost-cutting, was renamed Prometheus Global Media, and was then subsumed under 
the Guggenheim Digital Media division. Guggenheim further built the library with more 
publishing assets, including Backstage, Film Journal International, and Mediabistro, before the 
entire catalogue of publications was spun out into its own company, Eldridge Industries. This 
hot-potato ownership, in which a media property bounces between multiple investment firms, 
each attempting to extract profit at the expense of labor, is not uncommon.  
For example, Dick Clark Productions, the historic production company created in 1957  
for its founder’s radio show and subsequent television shows, which include American 
Bandstand (ABC, 1957–1987) and The Dick Clark Show (ABC, 1958–1960), continues to 
produce variety, event, and award shows to this day. Its contemporary management, however, is 
rocky, to say the least. In 2002, it attracted the interest of investment firms Mosaic Media, then 
Mandalay Entertainment in 2004, before being taken over by the private equity firm Red Zone 
Capital Management in 2007. It was then sold again to a partnership led by Guggenheim Partners 
in 2012. Following a failed deal with China’s Wanda Group that valued the company at about $1 
billion dollars, Dick Clark Productions joined the aforementioned Eldridge Industries in 2017. A 
year earlier, to strengthen its trade publication portfolio, Eldridge acquired SpinMedia, adding 
online publications tailored to specific music audiences—Spin (alternative rock), Vibe (R&B and 
hip hop), and Stereogum (indie)—creating a diverse stable of niche media content coverage. In 
2018, Eldridge’s media holdings, now spanning trade publications, Dick Clark Productions, 
  
Media Rights Capital (which will be discussed below), and a minority stake in the trendy film 
distributor A24, were merged into an entity called Valence Media. It is worth pausing to consider 
the consequences of all this private equity mismanagement and financial extraction for 
Hollywood’s trade press. While The Hollywood Reporter, Billboard, and the others mentioned 
are now operated by Valence, a boutique investment firm, most of the rival trade press and 
entertainment publications (including Variety, Deadline Hollywood, Indiewire, and Rolling 
Stone) are owned by Penske Media Corporation, which is funded by Quadrangle Capital 
Partners, a private equity firm, and Third Point LLC, a hedge fund. As Hollywood and the music 
industry are ravaged by private equity extractions, its private equity based trade press is 
disincentivized to provide critical coverage of the devastation. 
 
Silver Lake Partners and TPG Capital, Hollywood’s Private Equity Shadow Studios. 
Following the financial crisis in 2008, many financial elites sought to take advantage of low 
interest rates and a landscape of distressed assets. Two private equity firms, Silver Lake Partners 
and TPG Capital, took a particular interest in Hollywood and over the subsequent years have 
assembled their own versions of film and television conglomerates. Hollywood’s talent agencies 
were the primary targets, the first of which was TPG’s investment in Creative Artists Agency, 
one of the industry’s two most powerful agencies. In 2010, TPG spent about $165 million for a 
35 percent stake in the company, then invested another $225 million in 2014 to give it a 53 
percent stake.36 Similarly, Silver Lake Partners acquired a 31 percent stake in William Morris 
Endeavor (WME), the industry’s other dominant talent agency, for $200 million in 2012, then 
followed that with a $500 million investment in 2014 to give it the largest ownership stake. With 
Silver Lake's funding, WME acquired sports and media group International Management Group 
  
(IMG) for $2.4 billion in 2013; the combined WME-IMG was now larger than its rival CAA in 
scale, with a market capitalization of roughly $5.6 billion.37Reflecting its conglomerate status, 
WME-IMG was reorganized into a holding company in October 2017 and renamed Endeavor, a 
callback to co-CEO Ari Emanuel’s original company, Endeavor Talent Agency. 
As we’ve seen, the first step in the private equity playbook is lowering overhead, and 
both CAA and Endeavor have been lowering costs by laying off several top-earning agents, 
cutting bonuses, and reducing expenses.38 “Suddenly guys who had been there for fifteen, twenty 
years, who thought they were just going to be CAA lifers, were getting pushed out without a 
parachute,” claims a rival agent.39 Salaries and bonuses for top agents are nowhere near their 
previous heights, but those who have remained at CAA and Endeavor have been incentivized 
with bits of equity that could translate to big paydays, if and when the companies go public. 
Even while cutting labor costs, Silver Lake and TPG have been spending freely in order 
to expand the scope of Endeavor and CAA’s business. Typically, in order to avoid conflicts of 
interest, film and television union contracts forbid talent agencies from participating in media 
production; consequently, talent agencies have moved aggressively into content outside of just 
film and television. Endeavor has been the most aggressive on this front, with expansions into 
sports (acquiring IMG and Professional Bull Riders), digital (partnering with Turner on an 
eSports league), events (acquiring Donald Trump’s Miss Universe Organization), fine art 
(partnering with Frieze, a contemporary art fair), and other agencies (acquiring the Wall Group 
and a stylist agency business as well as Global eSports Management). By 2016, Endeavor was 
ready to facilitate massive deals itself, with the acquisition of the professional mixed martial arts 
organization Ultimate Fighting Championship. The purchase cost $4 billion, financed by Silver 
Lake Partners, KKR, and MSD Capital.  
  
Amidst this acquisition spree, the talent agencies also began to skirt around the 
prohibition against film and television production as early as 2009. Both CAA and Endeavor, 
through the proxy of their private equity owners, set up inscrutable financing arms. Endeavor 
owns a stake in the Raine Group, a merchant bank formed with the help of Ari Emanuel in 2009, 
which invests in digital, media, and entertainment companies, such as Vice. Through Raine, 
Endeavor invests in Media Rights Capital, previously-mentioned, Valence-owned, opaquely-
named firm described as a “hybrid financier, rights-holder, and development pod.”40 It has been 
involved in a number of films that primarily feature so many Endeavor clients (actors and 
directors) that it could hardly be a coincidence, including Ted (Seth MacFarlane, 2012), Elysium 
(Neill Blomkamp, 2013), 22 Jump Street (Phil Lord and Chris Miller, 2014), and Furious 7 
(James Wan, 2015). Other investors in Media Rights Capital include Goldman Sachs, AT&T, 
advertising giant WPP, and the private equity firms ABRY Partners and Guggenheim Partners. 
In 2015, Silver Lake Partners acquired Cast & Crew Entertainment Services for $700 
million. This forty-year-old company provides many back-end accounting services to Hollywood 
productions, such as payroll processing, residuals processing, workers’ compensation services, 
health insurance, labor relations, production incentives, and production tax credit financing. The 
following year, Silver Lake acquired Cast & Crew’s main competitor, CAPS Payroll. Owning 
the combined data of two of the biggest payroll companies in Hollywood is an obvious strategic 
advantage, as the same company negotiates wages and residuals for its clients while having the 
historical and industry-wide data about those rates. Silver Lake has thus fashioned a new type of 
content business with financialized vertical integration. It now facilitates the talent (Endeavor), 
data (Cast & Crew and CAPS), financing and production (Media Rights Capital, Endeavor 
Content, IMG Original Content), exhibition (ownership stake of AMC Theatres), and investment 
  
portfolio (Raine, WME Ventures). Silver Lake’s “shadow studio” is itemized in Table 4, along 
with TPG’s. 
 
Table 4. Silver Lake and TPG Capital’s investments in the media sector which constitute 
vertically financialized ‘shadow studios.’ Source: Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg 
Businessweek. 
 
 TPG Capital Silver Lake 
Talent Agency CAA Endeavor (WME-IMG) 
Data  Cast & Crew 
  CAPS Payroll 
Content Production STX Media Rights Capital 
 Univision Miss Universe 
 Funny or Die UFC 
 Platform One Media Endeavor Content 
 Vice Media IMG Original Content 
 wiip  
Exhibition  AMC Theatres 
Investment Arms Evolution Media Capital Raine 
 CAA Ventures WME Ventures 
 Creative Labs  
 
 
At TPG-owned CAA, there has been a similar financialized content production arm in 
STX Entertainment, a film and television studio created by film producer Robert Simonds and 
TPG managing partner Bill McGlashan in 2014. TPG and Hony Capital, a Chinese private equity 
firm, provided the initial investment, with subsequent funding coming from a number of wealthy 
investors and a variety of East Asian firms, including Huayi Bros. Media, China’s largest private 
film company; Tencent, the Chinese tech giant; and PCCW, the Hong Kong telecom and media  
company. The publicized strategy is to develop, produce, and self-distribute a slate of eight to 
  
twelve films, targeting the star-driven, mid-range budget ($20-$80 million) movies for adult 
audiences that the traditional studios have neglected in favor of superhero franchises and 
children’s animation. Another way to look at STX, however, is as a production arm of CAA, as 
both are owned by TPG. 
Just as Silver Lake features its own Endeavor talent in its Media Rights Capital 
productions, TPG overwhelmingly features its own CAA talent in its STX productions. The Gift 
(Joel Edgerton, 2015), Free State of Jones (Gary Ross, 2016), Bad Moms (Jon Lucas and Scott 
Moore, 2016), and The Circle (James Ponsoldt, 2017) all feature above-the-line talent 
represented by CAA. STX negotiates its own distribution agreements directly with the big North 
American theater chains (i.e., AMC Theatres, Regal, and Cinemark), and its Chinese investors 
give it an advantage in being approved for release in their heavily-regulated and highly sought-
after market. Silver Lake’s attempt at fashioning its own content studio has thus far produced 
mostly underperforming film and television, relative to their budget, and though it relies on 
Showtime and Universal Home Entertainment for distribution in later release windows, its 
financialized vertical integration has managed to mostly avoid the big Hollywood conglomerates 
and represents a new approach to content production and distribution. 
 In recent years, the talent agencies have become bolder in flaunting the rules against 
production. Endeavor operates both IMG Original Content, which has more than fifty series and 
specials on its roster, as well as Endeavor Content, which has financed, packaged, or sold more 
than 100 films and TV shows since 2016, including Academy-Award winners Arrival (Denis 
Villeneuve, 2016), La La Land (Damien Chazelle, 2016), and Manchester by the Sea (Kenneth 
Lonergan, 2016), as well as the Emmy-winner Killing Eve (BBC, 2018-present). Known in 
industry jargon as “double-dipping,” the involvement of talent agencies in production was 
  
expressly banned by the Screen Actors Guild (SAG) for nearly sixty years, but its legality has 
been in limbo since the “master franchise agreement” between SAG and the talent agencies 
expired in 2002. As mentioned, this flagrant conflict of interest has caused strife with the WGA, 
which began flagging the practice as early as March 2018, claiming that “agencies have little 
incentive to defend or improve quotes (writers’ previous pay) because their compensation is not 
tied to the well-being of their client.”41  
The talent agencies can afford to be in open conflict with the WGA in part because film 
and television talent are no longer their sole focus. The expansion into other talent sectors such 
as sports, fashion, and fine art is one example of this diversification, while another is the move 
into corporate venture capital. CAA Ventures, for instance, invests in early-stage startup 
companies, including Uber (transportation networking), Meerkat (mobile live streaming), Funny 
or Die (comedy-focused website and production company), and WhoSay (social media services 
and branding for celebrities). Evolution Media, another investment subsidiary within CAA, also 
provides seed funding to startups with capital from TPG’s fund, as well as negotiating and 
structuring over $37 billion of sports media deals since 2015.42 Endeavor also has a pair of 
investment subsidiaries, the aforementioned Raine and WME Ventures, that offer access to an 
even broader network, including film, television, digital media, fashion, music, sports, brands, 
and events. Because they are housed within talent agencies owned by private equity firms, these 
corporate venture capital firms offer their investment companies not only seed capital but also 
unique and valuable consultation on navigating Hollywood’s singular culture and connection to 
the agency’s talent roster.  
There is another finance-related and talent-adjacent entity that has increased its role 
within Hollywood, even more directly tied to “the 1 percent.” At least as far back as Howard 
  
Hughes, Hollywood has been a destination for the wealthy to spend their money in pursuit of 
fame and glamour. Financialized Hollywood is even more welcoming to this kind of patronage, 
with the added dimension of affluent heirs and heiresses spending their inheritance. The scope of 
boutique production and distribution companies funded by plutocratic patrons is outlined in 
Table 5, along with selections from their film and television roster. Blending “independently 
wealthy” with “independent film,” many of the films facilitated by billionaire boutiques are 
directed by auteurs, designed for awards, and marketed as “prestige.” Where is the financing 
from these films coming from? Idle capital earned by oil barons, shipping magnates, Wall Street 
vultures, and Silicon Valley tycoons. 
If not for the spoiled children of the wealthy, it would be more difficult for aging legends 
such as Martin Scorsese and Terrence Malick, acclaimed auteurs such as Alfonso Cuarón and the 
Coen brothers, television innovators such as Sam Esmail and Cary Joji Fukunaga, as well as 
newer filmmakers like Yorgos Lanthimos and Lulu Wang to get their films financed. It is thus 
tempting to consider this instance of financial capital as benign, even charitable. However, this 
subservience to plutocracy has reached new, explicit levels in contemporary Hollywood, far 
beyond the constraints to create challenging work in Hollywood that filmmakers have always 
faced. Megan Ellison, daughter of Larry Ellison (founder of Oracle and one of the wealthiest 
men in the world), has used her massive inheritance to become the patron to filmmakers like 
Kathryn Bigelow, Paul Thomas Anderson, and Spike Jonze. The name of her company? 
Annapurna, the Hindu goddess of nourishment. As we are witnessing in many sectors, 
democracy can’t function merely on the benevolance and “trickle down” ideologies of the 
wealthy; filmmaking is no different. What does it mean that Hollywood is increasingly reliant on 
the whims and vanity of the one percent? In a time of extreme wealth inequality, Hollywood’s  
  
Table 5. Boutique production/distribution companies funded by plutocratic patrons in 
Hollywood. Source: Variety and The Hollywood Reporter. 
Year Company Plutocratic Patron Films 
2000 Anonymous 
Content 
Laurene Powell Jobs, 
widow of Steve Jobs 
(Apple) 
Spotlight (Tom McCarthy, 2015), The Revenant (Alejandro 
González Iñárritu, 2016), Mr. Robot (USA, 2015-2019), True 
Detective (HBO, 2014-present) 
2004 Participant 
Media 
Jeff Skoll (eBay) Good Night, and Good Luck (George Clooney, 2005), The 
Inconvenient Truth (Davis Guggenheim, 2006), Citizenfour 
(Laura Poitras, 2014), Roma (Alfonso Cuarón, 2018) 
2004 Sidney 
Kimmel 
Entertainment 
Sidney Kimmel (Jones 
Apparel Group) 
The Lincoln Lawyer (Brad Furman, 2011), The Place Beyond the 
Pines (Derek Cianfrance, 2013), Hell or High Water (David 
Mackenzie, 2016) 
2005 Big Beach Marc Turtletaub, son of 
Alan Turtletaub (The 
Money Store) 
Little Miss Sunshine (Valerie Faris and Jonathan Dayton, 2006), 
Away We Go (Sam Mendes, 2009), Safety Not Guaranteed 
(Colin Trevorrow, 2012), The Farewell (Lulu Wang, 2019) 
2009 Cross Creek 
Pictures 
Timmy Thompson (oil 
tycoon) 
The Black Swan (Darren Aronofsky, 2010), The Ides of March 
(George Clooney, 2011), Hacksaw Ridge (Mel Gibson, 2016) 
2009 Faliro House 
Productions 
Christos V. 
Konstantakopoulos, son 
of Vassilis C. 
Konstantakopoulos 
(shipping tycoon) 
Before Midnight (Richard Linklater, 2013), Only Lovers Left 
Alive (Jim Jarmusch, 2014), The Lobster (Yorgos Lanthimos, 
2016), The Founder (John Lee Hancock, 2016) 
2010 Skydance 
Media 
David Ellison, son of 
Larry Ellison (Oracle) 
True Grit (Ethan Coen and Joel Coen, 2010), Star Trek Into 
Darkness (J.J. Abrams, 2013), Mission Impossible - Rogue 
Nation (Christopher McQuarrie, 2015) 
2011 Waypoint 
Entertainment 
Ken Kao, son of Min Kao 
(Garmin) 
Silence (Martin Scorsese, 2016), Knight of Cups (Terrence 
Malick, 2016), The Nice Guys (Shane Black, 2016), Song to 
Song (Terrence Malick, 2017) 
2011 Annapurna 
Pictures 
Megan Ellison, daughter 
of Larry Ellison (Oracle) 
20th Century Women (Mike Mills, 2016), Foxcatcher (Bennett 
Miller, 2015), Her (Spike Jonze, 2016), American Hustle (David 
O. Russell, 2013), Zero Dark Thirty (Kathryn Bigelow, 2012) 
2012 Black Bear 
Pictures 
Teddy Schwarzman, son 
of Stephen Schwarzman 
(Blackstone) 
The Imitation Game (Morten Tyldum, 2014), Gold (Stephen 
Gaghan, 2016), All is Lost (J. C. Chandor, 2013), Broken City 
(Allen Hughes, 2013) 
2012 RatPac 
Entertainment 
James Packer, son of 
Kerry Packer (Australian 
media tycoon) 
Gravity (Alfonso Cuarón, 2013), The Lego Movie (Chris Miller 
and Phil Lord, 2014), Mad Max: Fury Road (George Miller, 
2015), Batman v Superman (Zack Snyder, 2016) 
2013 Boies/Schiller 
Film Group 
David Boies 
(lawyer/private equity) 
Gold (Stephen Gaghan, 2016), Jane Got a Gun (Gavin 
O'Connor, 2016), The Babysitter (McG, 2017) 
2014 Black Label 
Media 
Molly Smith, daughter of 
Fred Smith (FedEx) 
La La Land (Damien Chazelle, 2016), Sicario (Denis 
Villeneuve, 2015), Breaking a Monster (Luke Meyer, 2015) 
2015 Primeridian 
Entertainment 
Arcadiy Golubovich, son 
of Alexei Golubovich 
(Russian oil tycoon) 
Third Person (Paul Haggis, 2014), 99 Homes (Ramin Bahrani, 
2015), A Hologram for the King (Tom Tykwer, 2016) 
  
  
ability to comment on our crisis is immobilized by its dependence on that same disparity. Truly 
radical film and television that challenges capitalist oppression will require a non-plutocratic 
structure. 
This is not to say that these billionaire boutiques are not producing any interesting film or 
television. In fact, Black Bear Pictures alone has produced progressive films like the agri-
business critique At Any Price (Ramin Bahrani, 2013), the corporate-mining drama Gold 
(Stephen Gaghan, 2016), and the Barack Obama biography Barry (Vikram Gandhi, 2016). 
However, Black Bear was founded by Teddy Schwarzman with money from his father, Stephen 
Schwarzman, the co-founder of Blackstone, the private equity firm that holds approximately 
$550 billion in assets and was involved in the aforementioned buyouts of Univision and Nielsen, 
among countless others in the wider economy. Blackstone’s landlord practices have been 
criticized by the United Nations for “wreaking havoc” in communities with “aggressive 
evictions” and “constant escalation of housing costs,” contributing to the “financialization of 
housing.”43 Schwarzman also once remarked that Barack Obama’s mere suggestion to raise the 
carried interest tax rate (key to private equity profit) was “like when Hitler invaded Poland in 
1939.”44 In this case, following the money raises some uncomfortable questions regarding the 
culpability of ‘indie’ Hollywood’s relationship with plutocracy. Are these films progressive? Or 
do they cynically exploit progressive themes for the further enrichment of their plutocratic 
patrons? Regardless of your position, the mere existence of these films is a fitting, paradoxical 
symbol of our gilded age. 
 
Content Catalogues as Private Equity Investment Portfolio. Cultural producers “have to 
insure themselves against the risks of failure associated with cultural commodities,” according to 
  
French media theorist Bernard Miège, and “the construction of a catalogue [is] the only way to 
spread the risks.”46 For this reason, film libraries have always been a lucrative asset for the 
Hollywood system, a history Eric Hoyt dates back to the 1910’s.47 Unlike individual films, 
which are a risky venture, film libraries are a reliable, diversified asset with long-term profit 
potential, no matter the pedigree or built-in audience. Private equity, consequently, has looked 
upon Hollywood libraries as robust investment opportunities. Again, Bain Capital was the 
pioneer in this strategy, acquiring LIVE Entertainment, a home video distributor, back in 1997. 
Later named Artisan Entertainment, it grew its library from 2500 titles to 7000 through 
acquisitions of the rights of Hallmark Entertainment and Republic Entertainment, among others. 
(It also produced smash hits like The Blair Witch Project [Eduardo Sánchez and Daniel Myrick, 
1999]). Artisan’s CEO, Amir Malin, has since formed Qualia Capital, which manages and 
advises on intellectual property asset portfolios, funding acquisitions such as the Rysher 
Entertainment, Gaylord, and Pandora libraries, with the backing of Canyon Capital Partners. As 
mentioned previously, the MGM acquisition by Providence, TPG, and others in 2004 
demonstrates the limits of this investment approach, as the timing of that deal—just as DVD 
sales were peaking but too early for streaming video’s rise—resulted in bankruptcy. Other types 
of content portfolio investment that became popular during that period’s easy credit have proven 
equally risky. 
In the years prior to the Great Recession, Wall Street capital flooded into Hollywood. 
Whereas previously the studios typically relied on passive, revolving lines of credit from banks, 
funds were now designed for private equity firms, hedge funds, and investment banks to actively 
participate in financing smaller catalogues of films. An estimated $15 billion was pumped into 
“slate-financing,” in which a series of films (upwards of twenty-five) were produced from the 
  
same pool of capital, thereby diversifying the risk and return.48 Former venture capitalist turned 
film financier Ryan Kavanaugh excelled in arranging these investment funds. Gun Hill I, for 
example, was the name of a $600 million fund for eleven Sony films and nine Universal films in 
2006; one year later, Gun Hill II raised another $700 million for another twenty films.49 Both 
funds were backed by Deutsche Bank and performed disastorously for investors. By 2007, every 
major studio had lined up PE backers for at least one slate. Kimberly Owczarski has detailed the 
use of slate-financing by both Kavanaugh’s Relativity Media and Legendary Pictures, 
considering the ways in which Wall Street finance allowed these minor studios the temporary 
ability to compete with the major studios.50 With the former ending in corruption,two instances 
of bankruptcy, and a new group of investors attempting to resuscitate it, and the latter resulting in 
an acquisition by Chinese media giant Wanda, these two examples demonstrate the destructive 
and consolidating impact of Wall Street finance in Hollywood. 
Another destructive example is the case of Steven Mnuchin, a former Goldman Sachs 
trader and hedge fund manager, who exploited the housing crisis and then used that money to 
enter Hollywood. The story begins with Mnuchin acquiring IndyMac, a mortgage lending bank 
that had failed in 2008 and was seized by the United States Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). With a group of investors, Mnuchin renamed IndyMac OneWest Bank and 
then aggressively foreclosed on homeowners for profit, earning the accusation of “widespread 
misconduct” by the state attorney general department for repeatedly breaking California’s 
foreclosure laws and forging documents.51 The investors put $1.5 billion into the bank and sold it 
for more than $3 billion five years later. Mnuchin then turned his vulture capitalist tendencies to 
Hollywood. His financing firm Dune Entertainment invested in a catalogue of more than seventy 
films with Fox starting in 2006, while another funding company, Rat-Pac Dune Entertainment, 
  
founded with producer-director Brett Ratner and billionaire James Packer in 2013, formed a 
seventy-five picture deal with Warner Bros. Mnuchin has profited handsomely from such 
megahits as Avatar (James Cameron, 2009), The LEGO Movie (Chris Miller and Phil Lord, 
2014), American Sniper (Clint Eastwood, 2014), Batman v Superman: Dawn of Justice (Zack 
Snyder, 2016), and Suicide Squad (David Ayer, 2016), as well as, appropriately, Wall Street: 
Money Never Sleeps (Oliver Stone, 2010). As Secretary of the Treasury under President Donald 
Trump, Mnuchin has turned to a far larger transfer of capital to the wealthy, helping orchestrate 
the $1.9 trillion Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. By 2027, the bill will actually raise taxes on most 
Americans, while 82% of the benefits will go to the top 1 percent.52 
Mnuchin fared better in Hollywood than most; despite their sophisticated risk-
management strategies, many financiers suffer when they encounter “Hollywood accounting,” 
the dubious, byzantine math by which film-financing is engineered asymmetrically so that 
individual films rarely achieve profit on paper yet the distributors still earn massive fees. 
Furthermore, the films offered up to slate-financing deals are often the riskiest studios have; they 
prefer to finance their reliable films themselves, particularly their franchises, and retain the bulk 
of that revenue. Compounding this difficulty, the credit crunch forced many financiers to pull out 
of these slate-financing deals in 2007 and 2008 and sell their Hollywood assets at a discount of 
up to seventy percent.53 Most of these deals were considered failures, with investors losing 
hundreds of millions of dollars. Of course, every failure in the finance market just means another 
opportunity for some other alignment of capital.  
Content Partners, for instance, was more than happy to buy these distressed investments. 
A financial boutique that acquires intellectual property, founded by two financiers who had 
worked for talent agencies, Content Partners began in 2006 as a sort of payday loan firm for 
  
profit participation. They would offer actors, directors, and producers a lump sum of cash in 
exchange for the revenues associated with the long-term release windows of syndication, 
physical media sales, and streaming rights. Backed by JP Morgan, Carlyle, and other wealthy 
investors, Content Partners expanded into larger intellectual property assets, including the 
discounted slate-financing deals, as well as a 50 percent stake in CBS’s lucrative CSI franchise 
(700+ episodes that are on the air in 200+ countries) for an estimated $400 million.54 In 2017, 
Content Partners acquired Revolution Studios, which itself was a private equity-owned 
production company and intellectual property management firm, having acquired the libraries of 
Morgan Creek International, Cold Spring Pictures, and OK Films.55 By 2019, the aggregated 
investment portfolio of Content Partners has reached 400 films and nearly 3000 hours of 
television.57 
Unlike in 2004 when the MGM library proved overvalued, Content Partners’ library is 
now proving a lucrative asset, easily exploitable in the gold-rush atmosphere of digital streaming 
distribution led by Netflix, Amazon, Hulu, Disney+, Apple TV+, HBO Max, CBS All Access, 
Peacock, and others. Diverse libraries are a crucial lure for attracting digital subscribers to 
streaming platforms; consequently, private equity firms have been securing them as much as 
possible. In 2010, Disney sought to unload Miramax’s famed indie library of 700+ films, which 
consists of almost 300 Oscar nominees, including Pulp Fiction (Quentin Tarantino, 1994), There 
Will Be Blood (Paul Thomas Anderson, 2007), and No Country for Old Men (Ethan Coen and 
Joel Coen, 2007). Tom Barrack, CEO of private equity firm Colony Capital, along with 
investment from Tutor Perini, a construction magnate, acquired the library for nearly $700 
million.58 Colony Capital barely added any new productions to the library while they owned it; 
  
nevertheless, they were able to sell it in 2016 to Qatar-based broadcaster BeIN Media Group and 
earn 3.5 times their equity investment, demonstrating the increasing value of content libraries.59 
A series of smaller private equity library deals have taken place since the rise of 
streaming as well. In 2011, the PE firm Vista Equity Partners invested in MarVista 
Entertainment, a production, distribution, and acquisition company with 2,500 hours of film and 
television content. In 2015, the consortium Ambi Group, backed by PE firm Raven Capital 
Management, acquired the library of Exclusive Media Group, which contains approximately 400 
titles, including Cruel Intentions (Roger Kumble, 1999), Memento (Christopher Nolan, 2000), 
The Mexican (Gore Verbinski, 2001), Donnie Darko (Richard Kelly, 2001), and The Ides of 
March (George Clooney, 2011). In order to add value to the library, a film fund was also 
established to finance and produce mid-level, star-driven films, similar to the previously 
mentioned STX. 
These catalogues pale in comparison to the size and scope of the catalogues held by the 
major Hollywood studios. Warner Bros., for example, holds one of the most extensive film 
libraries, with rights to over 7,000 feature films that it monetizes across various release windows, 
including network television, cable, premium cable, OnDemand, DVD and Blu-ray, digital sales 
and rentals, and streaming platforms. A prolific producer of television since the 1950s, Warner 
Bros. owns 5,000 television programs, making for tens of thousands of episodes; combined with 
its film library, this amounts to 80,000 hours of programming.60 The Warner Bros. catalogue, set 
to be utilized by HBO Max, was a key asset motivating AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner, 
now WarnerMedia. Conglomerates with a historical connection to one of the three major 
broadcast networks, meanwhile, have even larger television catalogues. Comcast, for instance, 
inherited NBCUniversal’s catalogue, which includes the rights to 100,000 television episodes 
  
and 5,000 films that will fuel its Peacock streaming service.61 The major film and television 
conglomerates are growing and consolidating their libraries as they transition into a streaming-
based distribution system. The debt-financed work of private equity accelerates this 
consolidation. 
 
Financing Media Consolidation. The result of institutional investment, venture capital, private 
equity, and financial engineering in Hollywood is a surge in the consolidation that has been 
transforming the media sector since the 1970s. Financialization is facilitating an increase in scale 
in a global marketplace and permitting big media companies to take on massive debt to enact 
mergers and acquisitions, as seen in Table 6. Telecommunications companies have targeted 
content companies in order to expand beyond their traditional role as mere providers of network 
access , in such massive deals as Comcast’s acquisition of NBCUniversal and AT&T’s purchase 
of DirecTV and Time Warner. Content companies, meanwhile, have sought out sources of 
intellectual property in order to expand content catalogues, as the sector transitions to streaming 
technology in which viewers privilege access over ownership. Media industry historians have 
certainly written about mergers, acquisitions, and the broader issue of concentration of media 
ownership before, but we need to understand the increasingly financialized dimensions of this 
ownership better, especially its private equity aspects. The impact of PE’s financial engineering 
on the cultural industries should not be underestimated; as Matthew Crain notes in an early look 
at this phenomenon, “private equity ownership exacerbates the ongoing evisceration of our 
media institutions.”62 
The concentration of ownership in Hollywood, hastened by the financial sector over the 
last fifteen years, is visible in the market share of total theatrical box office. Figure 1 is a  
  
Table 6. Mergers and acquisitions in Hollywood and American telecommunications, 2004-2019. 
Source: Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg Businessweek. 
 
Year Target Buyer/Partner/Investor Cost/bn Type Medium 
2004 Universal General Electric/NBC 5.8 Merger Film/TV 
2005 AT&T Southwestern Bell Corp 16 Merger Telecom 
2006 BellSouth Corp AT&T 67 Acquisition Telecom 
2006 Pixar Disney 7.4 Acquisition Film/TV 
2006 Adephia Cable Comcast 5.6 Acquisition Telecom 
2009 NBCU Comcast 37.3 Majority Stake Film/TV 
2009 Marvel Disney 4.2 Acquisition Film/TV 
2012 AMC Theatres Dalian Wanda Group 2.6 Acquisition Exhibition 
2012 Lucasfilm Disney 4.1 Acquisition Film/TV 
2013 NBCU (GE's 49%) Comcast 16.7 Acquisition Film/TV 
2013 Virgin Media Liberty 16.3 Acquisition Telecom 
2014 DirecTV AT&T 48.1 Acquisition Telecom 
2015 Time Warner Cable Charter 78.7 Merger Telecom 
2015 Charter Liberty Broadband 4.3 Investment Telecom 
2016 Yahoo Verizon 4.8 Acquisition Telecom 
2016 Legendary Dalian Wanda Group 3.5 Acquisition Film/TV 
2016 Dreamworks Animation Comcast 3.8 Acquisition Film/TV 
2016 Starz Lionsgate 4.4 Acquisition Film/TV 
2016 Odeon & UCI Cinemas AMC Theatres 1.2 Acquisition Exhibition 
2016 Carmike Cinemas AMC Theatres 1.1 Acquisition Exhibition 
2017 TimeWarner AT&T 85.4 Acquisition Film/TV 
2018 Scripps Discovery 14.6 Acquisition Film/TV 
2018 Regal Cineworld 3.6 Acquisition Exhibition 
2019 Fox Disney 52.4 Acquisition Film/TV 
2019 CBS Viacom 30 Merger Film/TV 
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representation of this increased domination of the major studios in the financial era. The 
combined market share of all independent film distributors hovers between a mere 6 to 10 
percent, while global blockbuster franchises propel Disney, Universal, and Warner Bros. to 
larger and larger shares. Since its acquisitions of Pixar, Lucasfilm, and Marvel, along with their 
lucrative intellectual properties, Disney has dramatically increased its market share; its 
acquisition of key Fox assets will see its market share approaching 40 percent and a clearly 
dominant position in the industry. The future imagined by David Mitchell in the novel Cloud 
Atlas, in which movies are just known as “disneys,” might not be too far off.63 
As it does elsewhere in the gilded economy, such consolidation results in stagnation, 
fewer jobs, reduced operational capacity, homogeneity, and higher prices. Total movie ticket 
sales are on a steady decline, though profits have been propped up by increasing ticket prices, 
particularly 3D surcharges, as well as continued expansion into global markets, especially China. 
Hollywood is not yet the oligopoly of three (Universal, Warner, Sony) that the recorded music 
industry has become, but if that industry’s experience with private equity and financialization is 
any indication, further concentration and inequality in Hollywood is on the horizon.   
Hollywood shares another parallel with the music industry in that a new streaming 
technology platform with considerable financial backing is transforming its distribution model. 
Just as Spotify is leading to a sea change in the economics and consumption patterns of recorded 
music, Netflix is pioneering a transition in the film and television industry. Unlike music, 
however, where the line between consumption (most streaming music listening occurs on 
Spotify, Apple Music, or Amazon Music) and catalogue production (most popular musicians are 
signed to Universal, Warner, or Sony) is fairly distinct, resulting in minimal competition or 
innovation, the film and television industry is much more unsettled and the lines between 
  
production, distribution, exhibition, and consumption much more blurred.64 Netflix has moved 
aggressively into this precarious situation, transitioning from a DVD delivery service into a 
global streaming video platform, content producer, and the belle of Wall Street. Crossing the 100 
million subscriber mark in 2017, Netflix shares rose 13,000 percent since its IPO in 2002, 
making for the second highest returns on the S&P 500 over the last fifteen years.65 Originally 
seen by Hollywood as just another release window, Netflix has become something of a frenemy 
to the legacy conglomerates: a valuable destination to license its wares but also a threat to its 
dominance as Netflix moves into original content production. Hedging their bets, four of the 
major studios developed an important counterstrategy: their own streaming platform, Hulu. 
With early investment from Providence Equity Partners, Hulu launched in 2007 and has 
grown into a formidable Netflix rival. Although it lacks Netflix’s global footprint and has fewer 
subscribers, Hulu has quickly surpassed Netflix in an important long-term metric: catalogue size. 
In addition to next-day availability of television shows from four of the five major networks, 
Hulu secured exclusive deals with Comedy Central, AMC, Bravo, E!, A&E, FX, Syfy, USA, Fox 
Sports, PBS, Nickelodeon, and Epix. As Netflix moved into original programming, so did Hulu, 
with high-profile, award-winning series. By 2016, Hulu could boast a catalogue spanning more 
than 6,600 movies and nearly 3,600 television series, compared to Netflix’s 4,500 and 2,400, 
respectively.66 For Netflix, this catalogue tally represents a drop by over 50 percent, from a high 
of roughly 11,000 titles in 2012.67 The company accounts for this drop by claiming it is focusing 
on original content production, but the reality is a proxy fight between traditional Hollywood, 
Netflix, and Wall Street. 
Catalogue size, which reflects the economics of distribution and licensing, is just one of 
the battlefronts between legacy Hollywood companies and Netflix; data is another crucial vector. 
  
Essential to Netflix’s public image and branding strategy is the ability to mine its global 
consumption data to make content more appealing to target demographics and to fuel the 
personalized, algorithmic suggestions for users. But until Disney’s recent purchase of Fox, 
leading to their majority ownership of Hulu, it was jointly owned by Disney, Fox, Comcast, and 
Time Warner. Though unacknowledged in the trade press, I confirmed with a Hulu executive in 
a personal conversation that each of its parent companies have access to its trove of data (a 
common feature of corporate venture capital relationships). With such an extensive catalogue 
that spans many formats and demographics, the granular consumer data generated by Hulu gave 
an important advantage to these four Hollywood conglomerates. It also bound them together in 
their cold war with Netflix. 
Around 2015, legacy media company executives began to hint openly at a joint effort to 
limit Netflix’s ascent. Time Warner CEO Jeff Bewkes argued against undercutting its own 
business “by having somebody else [Netflix] pay a fraction of the cost and create a better 
inventory on the various shows you yourself invented,” while Discovery CEO David Zaslav 
proclaimed that “it’s just not rational that… [we] have allowed [Netflix] to gain so much share 
and offer it without our brands.”68 FX president John Landgraf indicated a “concerted effort not 
to only sell to Netflix,” and Fox CEO James Murdoch declared that “the business rules around 
how we sell to [Subscription-Video-On-Demand] providers is changing.”69 By this point, 
however, Netflix was expanding rapidly; its international expansion was in full force and its 
subscriber numbers and stock price climbed along with it. 
This is not the first time legacy Hollywood companies have been challenged by new 
technology; in fact, Hollywood’s history is one of initially resisting but eventually profiting off 
of every technological advancement, from synchronized sound to television syndication to home 
  
video formats and into the digital age. Disney+, HBO Max, and Peacock will soon join Hulu and 
CBS All Access (from the newly re-merged ViacomCBS) as legacy Hollywood moves belatedly 
but aggressively into direct-to-customer (D2C) streaming distribution. History would suggest 
that streaming technology will be merely one more entertainment format that the Hollywood 
conglomerates eventually dominate, except this time, the challengers are well-funded by a 
financial sector that is chasing dwindling investment opportunities in a hollowed-out economy. 
Looking for the next Facebook, Wall Street has rewarded Netflix’s ability to rapidly grow its 
global subscriber base, ignoring its growing debt and comparative lack of earnings in the hopes 
of a future windfall. Amazon, similarly, received years of Wall Street investment despite a 
distinct lack of profits, using that coffer to increase scale and expand into a vast array of 
industries, including streaming media. According to JustWatch, a web service that aggregates 
what is available on each streaming service, Amazon Prime Video was offering nearly 25,000 
films and television series in 2019, a catalogue that dwarfs both Hulu and Netflix. Along with 
Apple and Google, each a crucial interface for the digital consumption of film and television, this 
handful of tech stocks has come to be known as FAANG: Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, 
and Google. In March of 2019, these five companies together held a market capitalization of $3.1 
trillion, a value bigger than the gross domestic product of all but four countries; only the U.S., 
China, Japan, and Germany are bigger than FAANG.71 However, total net income for the 
FAANG companies in 2018 was only $93 billion, most of which came from Apple’s lucrative 
iPhone sales, so the massive market capitalization of FAANG is an extreme form of investor 
speculation.72 Wall Street is literally banking on a future in which these five companies dominate 
and monopolize their respective industries, producing far more income to justify their valuation. 
Will traditional Hollywood conglomerates become mere content suppliers to these bigger tech 
  
titans, or will they be able to compete for customers on their own terms? Unfortunately for us as 
citizens, the terms of this competition are not content, or culture, but mere financial extraction. 
 
The Future of Financialized Hollywood. Caught up in this swirl of speculation, Hollywood 
faces an uncertain future. Its film industry is steady, but declining. The conglomerates have 
priced out most competition with ever-increasing budgets, global marketing campaigns, and the 
most well-known intellectual properties. Television, however, is in flux and subject to 
transformation. There is a confluence of trends moving in opposite directions that suggest, at 
best, a volatile, competitive market and, at worst, a bubble ready to burst. Both cable television 
channels and scripted television productions have dramatically expanded in the last decade, 
which FX President John Landgraf famously referred to as “Peak TV.”73 One might assume that 
if supply is being increased so acutely, demand must be growing as well, but “cord-cutting,” in 
which pricey cable television subscriptions (averaging over a hundred dollars a month) are being 
exchanged for more affordable video-on-demand internet services (averaging ten dollars a 
month) or free, over-the-air broadcast television, continues to accelerate, reaching nearly 5% 
annual decline in 2019.74  
The other key revenue source in the television ecosystem is advertising sales, which 
peaked in 2016 and are projected to decline at least 2 percent a year.75 Advertising dollars are 
increasingly diverted away from traditional media formats such as television and newspapers and 
into Google and Facebook. This “digital duopoly” accounted for 75 percent of all new online ad 
spending in 2015—nearly 60 percent of the digital market—and surpassed the television 
advertising market in 2017.76 Furthermore, overall employment in the broadcasting industries is 
declining while expenses are rising. With fewer cable subscriptions, declining advertising 
  
dollars, and increased expenses, one would expect the television industry to be facing “Valley 
TV” or “Nadir TV” rather than “Peak TV.” The only explanation is a speculative tidal wave 
funded by Wall Street, wherein investors are escalating production and distribution, hoping that 
they will have placed their bets on the right configuration of culture and content. 
As one of the world’s most successful investors Warren Buffett once said, “you only find 
out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out.”77 In this case, when the tide goes out, as it 
must in a bubble-driven economy, it will be the operating capacity, diversity, and talent of the 
U.S. film and television industries that are left vulnerable during the next recession. Media 
scholars need to understand the gravity of the problem that is “Financialized Hollywood” in 
order to advocate for its correction. “Resistance must know about financial regulation in order to 
demand it,” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak recently proclaimed. “We must produce knowledge of 
these seemingly abstract globalized systems so that we can challenge the social violence of 
unregulated capitalism.”78 
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